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LET'S NOT ABANDON WHAT WORKS
Edward Clair*
Editor's Note: The following is a transcript adaptation of Mr. Edward Clair's
remarks on Friday, November 2, 2007 at the West Virginia University College
of Law's Law Review Symposium: Thinking Outside the Box: A Post-Sago
Look at Coal Mine Safety.**
It is an honor to be here again. Last spring, Davitt McAteer, myself,
and others laid out some of the challenges that have proven to be barriers to
further improvement in mine safety and health, and then we suggested some
ideas for further consideration. And I'm very pleased to be back today to talk
about that.
I am a little embarrassed by the title of my presentation. I'm not here to
tell you that nothing needs to be changed or that the status quo is the perfect
answer.
What I do want to suggest to you, though, is that there is much in the
structure of the U.S. approach to protecting miners' health and safety that
should be preserved, and I didn't want to use the clich6 of throwing the baby out
with bath water, but there is a lot that has proven to be successful. I don't want
us to lose sight of that.
I put this chart up' because I think it speaks volumes about the suc-
cesses that have been accomplished under the Federal Mine Safety and Health
Act of 1977.2 Today I will talk about that act, the Mine Act of 1977,3 and then
the MINER Act of 2006,4 which was signed into law on June 15, 2006 by Presi-
Mr. Edward Clair is Associate Solicitor for Mine Safety and Health at the U.S. Department
of Labor. He has held this position since 1987. Prior to his tenure at the Department of Labor, he
was a Deputy Associate Solicitor and Counsel for Coal Mine Standards and Legal Advice. Mr.
Clair is a 1972 graduate of Georgetown University Law Center and a 1968 graduate of Rutgers
University. Since participating in this symposium, Mr. Clair was awarded the 2008 Philip Arnow
Award, the Department of Labor's highest honor, and he was named Federal Labor and Employ-
ment Attorney of the Year by the American Bar Association.
Thinking Outside the Box: A Post-Sago Look at Coal Mine Safety,
http://lawschoolcoalconference.event.wvu.edu/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2008) (symposium webcast
available).
I See U.S. Mining Fatalities 1978-2006 ("Fatalities"), infra Slide 2.
2 See Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (Mine Act of 1977), Pub. L. No. 95-164,
91 Stat. 1290.
3 Id.
4 Id.; Mine Improvement and New Emergency Response Act of 2006 (MINER Act), Pub. L.
No. 109-236, 120 Stat. 493.
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dent Bush after going through Congress in record time as a direct result of the
Sago accident and the Aracoma and Darby accidents later in 2006. Then I'm
going to talk about the S-MINER Act,5 the Supplemental MINER Act, which is
a work in progress. It was introduced in both houses of Congress in June 2007.
It was voted out of the House Education and Labor Committee just last
Wednesday and is likely to be taken up by the House of Representatives before
the month is out.
My point in this talk is going to be that we need to stay focused on the
bottom line, and the bottom line is at the bottom of this chart.6 It's zero, and
that's where we need to be. When the 1977 Mine Act was passed, there were
just under 250 deaths of miners that year? That was by no means an historic
high. It was, at the time, a rather average year, perhaps even low - compared to
the terrible tragedies that marked the early 20h century.
Remarkable strides have been made in both metal/non-metal mining and
in coal mining to bring the number down from 250 to last year's total of sev-
enty-three. And this plateau in here was really where the debate was before
Sago. For mining, it appeared that we had hit a plateau of somewhere in the
neighborhood of fifty deaths a year roughly half coal, half metal/non-metal.
In the years immediately before Sago, we were searching to find what
could be done to get to the next level and that would bring us down further to-
wards zero. Then, of course, Sago, Aracoma, and Darby happened, and the ter-
rible year of 2006 produced what I profoundly hope is an aberrational up-tick to
the number 73 in 2006.
This year, of course, has been marked by the tragedy at Crandall Can-
yon in Utah. It was a double tragedy in that six miners died in the initial col-
lapse of that mine and then, as we all know, as the nation held its breath during
that terrible rescue and recovery operation, three very brave rescuers were also
killed, bringing the total to nine.8
The national and community tragedy was a personal tragedy for many
of us in the Mine Safety and Health Administration because one of those rescu-
ers who died was an MSHA inspector, who was underground assisting in the
rescue effort.9
I will come back to this graph at my close because I do think it speaks
volumes for a nation and a program that has moved in the right direction.'
5 S-MINER Act, H.R. 2768, 110th Cong. (2007).
6 See Fatalities, infra accompanying slide 2.
7 Injury Trends in Mining, http://www.msha.gov/MSHAINFO/FactSheets/MSHAFCT2.HTM
(last visited Sept. 5, 2008).
8 Underground Coal Mine: Fatal Underground Coal Burst Accidents Aug. 6 and 16, 2007:
Report of Investigation of the Mine Safety and Health Administration of the U.S. Dep't of Labor,
ID No.42-01715, 1, 31, 165, available at
http://www.msha.gov/Fatals/2007/CrandallCanyon/FTLC07CrandallCanyon.pdf.
9 Id.
10 Id.
[Vol. 111
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The Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 197711 was a landmark law
that built on the 1969 Coal Mine Health and Safety Act, 12 and it preserved many
of the features of the 1969 Coal Act. These are the fundamental building blocks
in the federal law governing mine safety and health.'
3
The first block is comprehensive health and safety standards. These are
standards that have been built up over time. The coal standards were originally
written by Congress with a great deal of assistance from the Bureau of Mines in
the Interior Department at the time.
These are the federal standards for mine safety and health in Title 30 of
the Code of Federal Regulations. 14 It is a very big book. It covers surface
mines, underground mines, coal mines, metal and non-metal mines, equipment
approval regulations, civil penalty regulations, and administrative procedures. It
is really the core of federal regulation of mining in terms of health and safety.
Those comprehensive health and safety standards govern everything, from when
you enter the property to when you leave. The statute is a strict liability statute,
and that means that the mine operator is responsible for compliance with those
standards and employee misconduct is not a defense to a violation. The negli-
gence that's associated with the violation will affect the amount of the penalty,
but the operator must comply and he will be penalized if he doesn't.'5
The second fundamental building block is the mandatory training re-
quirements. For underground mines, there is a requirement for forty hours of
training;1 6 for surface mines, there is a requirement for twenty-four hours of
training.
7
Annual refresher training and hazard training is required. Training is
focused on having the miner know exactly what is required of him or her in
terms of safety performance, as well as a mandatory annual instruction in min-
ers' rights.'
8
The third building block is mandatory inspections. Under the Mine Act,
federal inspectors are at underground mines four times a year and at surface
mines twice a year to conduct complete inspections.' 9 There's been a lot of
press coverage lately about the failure of MSHA to complete mandatory inspec-
tions at mines due to staffing shortages. That is an unfortunate fact. The agency
1 Pub. L. No. 95-164, 91 Stat. 1290.
12 Pub. L. No. 91-173, 83 Stat. 742.
13 See generally Mine Act of 1977. See also Mine Act of 1977 Fundamentals, infra slide 3.
14 See 30 C.F.R. § 1.1 (2007)
15 30 U.S.C. § 820(i) (2000).
16 30 C.F.R. § 48.5(2) (2002).
17 Id. § 48.25.
18 See generally id. §§ 48.8, 48.11, 48.28, 48.31.
19 See Mine Act of 1977, Pub.L. No. 95-164, 91 Stat. 1290 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 813(a)
(2000)).
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has since gotten additional funding and has authorized overtime and other
movement of resources to complete the mandatory inspections.
While the mandatory inspections were not completed in some cases,
there was a considerable federal presence at those mines, where inspectors fo-
cused on the high-hazard mining practices at the mine. But their inspection
activity did not qualify as a complete inspection of the mine in its entirety.
The mandatory inspections led to mandatory citation of violations. The
statute provides that inspectors must issue a citation if they believe that a stan-
dard has been violated.20 Every citation is assessed a civil penalty, the fourth
building block.21 There is also withdrawl order authority in the enforcement
scheme.22
It is a very rigorous and tough health and safety statute. All cited viola-
tions are assessed civil penalties. 23 Unlike OSHA, there are no de minimis vio-
lations that get no civil penalty; every violation is penalized.
24
MSHA had been criticized in the past for low civil penalties that were
not an effective deterrent, and steps have been taken - and I'll talk about those
in a bit - to beef up the penalty provisions under the 1977 Act and, now, the
MINER Act.
The fifth key building block is whistleblower protections. Under the
Mine Act, miners who make safety complaints are protected from retaliation.25
The Mine Act has one of the toughest, if not the toughest, whistleblower protec-
tion provisions in the federal system. Miners who are discharged because
they've made a safety complaint have a right to temporary reinstatement while
their case is being litigated through the administrative/judicial review system.26
They have a right to temporary reinstatement if their complaint is not frivo-
lous. 27 The "not frivolously brought" standard is about as low as you can get in
the federal system. And we, in the Solicitor's Office and at MSHA, do not shy
away from applying that standard as it was intended.
We now turn to the MINER Act of 200628 which made enhancements
within the same structure as the Mine Act. The point I want to focus on today,
and I think it was the focus of that statue, is post-accident survivability. And
that clearly is a response to the Sago, Aracoma, and Darby accidents of 2006.
20 Id. (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 813(g)(2), 814(a)).
21 Id. § 820.
22 Id. § 814(b),(d),(e); § 817.
23 See id. § 820(a)(1).
24 Id.
25 See Mine Act of 1977, Pub.L. No. 95-164, 91 Stat. 1290 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 815(c)(2)).
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Mine Improvement and New Emergency Response Act of 2006 (MINER Act), Pub. L. No.
109-236, 120 Stat. 493. See also Miner Act of 2006 Enhancements, infra slide 4.
[Vol. 111
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The Mine Act focused on prevention of accidents. If that line of de-
fense fails, and there is an accident where the miners are trapped, what can we
do to ensure or improve their chances of post-accident survivability? The
MINER Act requires more self-contained self-rescuers ("SCSRs") - breathing
devices that last about an hour - lifelines, and training to facilitate escape.29
It is difficult to breathe with an SCSR on. They get hot as they work.
They are not comfortable at all. They are not meant to be survival devices that
can keep a miner alive for any great length of time. They are meant to help get
you out of the mine.
Previously, there was a requirement that each miner have one SCSR.
Now, there are requirements that miners have access to far more. There must be
two immediately accessible to them where they work at the mine face.3° In ad-
dition, at distances towards the portal, there must be caches of more stored
SCSRs.31
Lifelines, a simple technology designed to guide miners out of the mine
when it becomes too dark to see or when miners' vision is impaired from the
dust and smoke of an explosion, are now required.32
Emergency response plans are also now required.33 This essentially
forced mine operators to have plans in place that would assist miners in escape
and also address the situation of trapped miners. The critical feature of every
plan is the provision for breathable air for trapped miners.M
The statute did not specify how much breathable air would be required
or how it would be supplied. Congress left that to the agency's expertise. The
agency has put a marker out there that says there are lots of ways to provide
breathable air, but we are looking for miners to be maintained alive, with air and
the necessary water and food to support them, for ninety-six hours.
The MINER Act also addressed the communications problem that was
so apparent at Sago, namely, the inability to know precisely where the miners
were and to communicate with them.36 The tracking requirement is currently
done mainly through a dispatcher system, where miners, as they travel about the
mine, will check in with the surface control room through the mine telephone
system. Thus, their location is known. Another technology exists where miners
29 MINER Act, 120 Stat. at 494-95 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 877(n) (2000)).
30 30 C.F.R. § 75.1714-4(a)(1) (2006).
31 30 U.S.C. § 875 (2006).
32 Id. § 876(b)(2)(E)(iv).
33 Id. § 876.
34 Id. § 876(b)(2)(E)(iii)(I).
35 IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 2 OF THE MINER AcT OF 2006, MSHA PROGRAM
INFORMATION BULLETIN No. P07-03 (Feb. 8, 2007), available at
http://www.msha.gov/regs/complianlpib/2007/pib07-03.asp.
36 Mine Improvement and New Emergency Response Act of 2006 (MINER Act), Pub. L. No.
109-236, 120 Stat. 493,494,495.
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can be tracked with some degree of certainty when a transponder that they are
carrying passes a fixed device on the wall of the mine.
The statutory goal by 2009 is wireless communications. 37 To be able to
communicate from the surface to underground and have it come back up again
without the benefit of wires is really on the forefront of technological ability.
We're not there yet, but there is an enormous amount of work being done now
to develop and perfect a wireless communication system.
In the meantime, the MINER Act required redundant, hard-wired sys-
tems that can survive an explosion or at least increase the likelihood of being
able to communicate with trapped miners.38 This can currently be accomplished
by installing the redundant communications systems in separate mine tunnels.
Crandall Canyon had a redundant hard-wired communications system.
They also had a PED system, which essentially is one-way from surface to un-
derground wireless communication. However, in the terrible pressure burst of
the coal ribs that support the roof, the state-of-the-art communication system
was wiped out. I feel certain that the explosions at Sago and Darby would also
have wiped out a redundant, hard-wired system. The MINER Act of 2006 also
addressed other post-accident survival issues, including rescue teams.39 Con-
gress specified some of the requirements for rescue teams but left it to the agen-
cy to develop rules and requirements for mine rescue teams through rulemaking.
A significant problem at Sago, as you recall, was the miscommunication
with the families. The MINER Act required that MSHA develop a program
where family liaisons are assigned to assist the families during a rescue opera-
tion and for the time period after that.40 MSHA has trained twenty-two liaisons
to fulfill that responsibility.
At Crandall Canyon, MSHA had three family liaisons assigned to be
with the families around the clock during three eight-hour shifts. The agency
supplied a knowledgeable liaison to assist the families in dealing with the issues
that attend to a protracted rescue operation.
The MINER Act also required that the agency develop procedures to act
as the primary communicator.41 If you recall, at Crandall Canyon, despite the
agency's best efforts, the primary communicator appeared to be the mine opera-
tor, Robert Murray. All I can tell you is that the agency held regular news con-
ferences, frequently before Mr. Murray would talk to the press, and the press ran
video footage of Bob Murray. I suppose he was a far more colorful and enter-
taining spokesman.
I think the Crandall Canyon experience points up a tension and a chal-
lenge for the agency as it tries to deal with modem communications, technolo-
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 MINER ACT, 120 Stat. 493; see also Miner Act of 2006 Enhancements Cont., infra slide 5.
40 120 Stat. 493, 500.
41 Id.
[Vol. I 11
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gies, and expectations that the public has for twenty-four hour, seven days-a-
week news coverage and information all the time, immediately. The agency can
try to control the flow of information, but the news media prints what it chooses
to print and puts on TV what it chooses to put on TV. In any event, the agency
has taken steps to fulfill its requirement to be the primary communicator.
The MINER Act mandated higher civil penalties and established mini-
mum penalties for particular violations having to do with unwarrantable fail-
ures.42 Those are the violations that are the result of aggravated conduct greater
than ordinary negligence. They are high negligence violations that can lead to
withdrawal orders.
Congress said the minimum penalty had to be at least $2,000 for unwar-
rantable failure citations and $4,000 for unwarrantable failure orders.43 There's
a minimum penalty of $5,000 for failure to notify the agency of an accident
within 15 minutes.44 This again is an outgrowth of the accidents in 2006 where
there was some delay in notifying MSHA.
On its own initiative, MSHA totally revised its existing penalty struc-
ture.45 The civil penalty system is based on a point system where the six statu-
tory factors are each assessed a penalty point, which translates into dollars.
46
The MSHA penalties previously were notoriously low. Through rulemaking,
the agency changed its penalty system, and now the total penalties are some-
where on the order of three times higher than what they had been in the past.
I have a number for you that only tells part of that story. In 2006, the
agency assessed $32 million in civil penalties. In Fiscal Year 2007, they upped
that to $57 million, and the new civil penalties were only in place for less than
four months of that twelve month period.47
So the civil penalties are, indeed, substantially higher. The goal, of
course, is that the higher penalties will induce compliance, and there will be
fewer violations, fewer citations, fewer penalties, and safer mines.
That's where we were until June of this year, when Congressman
George Miller, Chairman of the House Education and Labor Committee, intro-
duced a bill, and companion bills were introduced in the Senate, that would sub-
stantially amend the MINER Act. Congressman Miller, by the way, had voted
against the MINER Act because it didn't do enough in his view. The S-MINER
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 498.
45 MSHA Update and Implementation of the Miner Act: Statement Before the Subcomm. on
Employment and Workforce Safety of the S. Comm. on Health, Employment, Labor and Pensions,
110th Cong. (2008) (statement of Richard E. Stickler, Acting Asst. Sec. of Labor, U.S. Dep't of
Labor), available at http://www.msha.gov/MEDLAICONGRESS/2008/06192008.asp (see Sec-
tions 5 and 8 - - Penalties).
46 See 30 C.F.R. § 100.3 (2007).
47 See DEP'T OF LABOR, FIscAL YEAR 2009 BUDGET IN BRIEF, available at
http://www.dol.gov/_sec/budget2009/bib.pdf.
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Act as proposed by Congressman Miller takes up the challenge and in a com-
prehensive overhaul of the Mine Act and the MINER Act does many, many
things.
What I've tried to allude to with this slide "Everything Faster" is short-
hand for "Whatever was in the MINER Act, just do more of it and do it quick-
er." The bill was introduced in June, on the one-year anniversary of passage of
the MINER Act. And on Wednesday, October 31, it was voted out of the House
Committee. It is now on its way to the House floor where passage is expected.
I recommend it to you. You can find it through the website and any number of
reporting services.48 It is the latest word on mine safety and health improve-
ments by legislation.
Under the "Everything Faster" heading,49 I will point out just a few
things. And as I said, it's comprehensive; there are many things. It says that
120 days, four months, after enactment, the wireless communications systems
must be in place with the existing technology called a "leaky feeder., 50 There's
a "wireless mesh" alternative, but either one of those two alternatives needs to
be installed in mines.5* And then, any future enhancements must build on that
system. That has to happen within 120 days.52
By June 15, 2008, there must be interim final rules for refuge cham-
bers.53 These are portable refuge chambers that would provide a safe haven for
miners who are trapped underground. The alternative that the statute would
provide for is a notch in the coal rib that has bulkhead doors and would also
provide a safe haven.
I'm going to ask you to keep in mind the words "interim final rule."
That's a rule that is final when it's published. Then, as comment comes in af-
terwards, the agency may make adjustments, but the interim final rule becomes
the law on publication.
Three months after enactment, there must be new final rules for mine
seals.54 Seals were, of course, a major issue at Sago. The MINER Act had said
NIOSH is to make recommendations to MSHA, and MSHA is to engage in
rulemaking.55 MSHA is in that rulemaking now, but S-MINER Act would say
that, within three months of enactment, there must be new seals rules. 56 It speci-
48 See generally S-MINER Act, H.R. 2768, 110th Cong (2007).
49 S-MINER Act, H.R. 2768, 110th Cong. (2007). See also S-MINER Act Proposal, infra
slide 6.
50 Id. § 4(a)(2).
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id. § 4(b)(iv).
54 Id. § 4(c)(4).
55 See Mine Improvement and New Emergency Response Act of 2006 (MINER Act), Pub. L.
No. 109-236, 120 Stat. 493, 499.
56 S-MINER Act § 4(c)(4).
[Vol. I I I
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fies what the strength of those seals must be, and it also specifies monitoring
and other things.
In the interest of time, I will compress this. There are at least eight,
probably more, requirements in the S-MINER Act where Congress writes the
standard, putting it into place in a short timeframe, and defers to the agency's
expertise a little bit around the edges for fine tuning.
There are other provisions in the S-MINER Act for higher penalties,
advisory committees, and an ombudsman. 57 The ombudsman is in the Office of
the Inspector General ("OIG"), not MSHA. It's the OIG who will oversee the
way MSHA enforces the whistleblower protection provision and handles miner
safety complaints.58
Under the S-MINER Act several advisory committees are created.59
There's one that would look at whether mines should have a federal license to
even operate. That's a much different approach than exists today. There would
also be an advisory committee to see if all of these standards that apply to coal
mines should also apply to metal/non-metal mines.6°
One of the most significant provisions is on health standards. Other
speakers will be talking about this as well. Last spring, Davitt McAteer and I
both talked about the 1992 court decision that stands for the proposition that, in
order for MSHA or OSHA to update a health standard, it must go through a
substance-by-substance risk analysis and feasibility analysis to determine what
the new standard would be.6'
There are hundreds of chemical substances that are currently regulated
with standards dating back to 1972.62 They have not been updated because of
the rigorous rulemaking requirements.63 Last spring, at this podium, we said
that the process to update these critical health standards didn't work.
Congress will have solved the problem if the S-MINER Act becomes
law. Their solution essentially cuts through the notice and comment process,
establishes the standard, and then says, "If there's a feasibility concern," mean-
ing people can't comply because it's impossible, "then, the standard can be ad-
justed to the lowest level that is feasible."
One more closing comment about the S-MINER Act. I think what it
stands for is the proposition that MSHA can't be trusted to do the right thing
based on its expertise; so, Congress will take care of fulfilling the mandate to
improve miner health and safety.
57 Id. §§ 4(j),516.
58 Id. § 516.
59 Id. §§ 4(j), 516(/).
60 Id. § 4(j).
61 AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962, 927-73, 980 (11 th Cir. 1992)
62 See, e.g., 30 C.F.R. §§ 1910.1000 to 1910.1450 (2000).
63 See generally AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962, 973, 980 (11 th Cir. 1992).
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The failure of trust in the agency, I think, is widespread and seems to be
a given regardless of any particular Administration. From my perspective, it's
unfounded. However, we have to recognize that there is a distrust of the bu-
reaucratic process. So, Congress will step in and set the standards.
The S-MINER Act also constitutes a broad recognition that the rule-
making process is broken. The very technical decisions that were previously
left to agency expertise will now be made by Congress. And the public input is,
if not quite an afterthought, at least quite short-changed. The problem is that,
based on my experience over more than thirty years with MSHA, in every rule-
making, the agency has learned something through the public process, whether
it's from labor or the mine operators.
It is very difficult to get things right the first time. We learn from pub-
lic input. And a one-size-fits-all approach - which is kind of jargon, but how
else to describe it - is probably inappropriate for the complex situations we find
in practice in the nation's mines and in our economy generally. I think we need
a flexible system. I think the rulemaking system has big benefits. However, I
must admit that when it comes to updating controversial health standards, it
clearly is broken.
I want to leave you with a challenge today. Keep this chart in mind,
build on what has worked, and figure out how we get to the bottom line.64 And
the bottom line is zero. Everything that is done with respect to mine safety and
health ought to be measured against that yardstick. Does it help us get to zero?
64 U.S. Mining Fatalities 1978-2006 ("Fatalities"), infra slide 2.
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Mine Act of 1977 Fundamentals
* Comprehensive Safety and Health Standards
• Mandatory Training
" Mandatory Inspections - - All Violations Cited
" Mandatory Penalties
" Whistleblower Protections
MINER Act of 2006 Enhancements
Post-accident Survivability
" More SCSRs and Lifelines
• ERPs including Breathable Air for Trapped
Miners
" Tracking
" Redundant and Wireless Communications
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MINER Act of 2006 Enhancements
Cont.
" Rescue Teams
" Family Liaisons and Primary Communicator
" Higher Penalties
S-MINER Act Proposal
" Everything Faster
" Higher Penalties, Advisory Committees,
Ombudsman
* Health Standards
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